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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE 0^ UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICKY PALMER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890583-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief and refers this Court 
to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, and 
the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State is correct that Mr. Palmer was placed under 
arrest and given his Miranda warnings prior to being x-rayed. The 
first sentence in the second full paragraph of the fact statement on 
page 6 of Appellant's opening brief should be amended to read: "The 
officers transported Mr. Palmer to the Salt Lake County Jail and 
placed him in an isolation cell." 
Mr. Palmer takes issue with the State's claim that "Mayo's 
testimony is most fairly interpreted as indicating that a warrant 
could be obtained in no less than two hours." Appellee's Brief at 
4. Sergeant Mayo actually testified that "[t]hey have sped up the 
procedure [for obtaining telephonic warrants]" and that he assumed 
he could obtain one "within two hours." T 40-1. See Addendum A for 
transcript of testimony at issue. 
This Court's determination of the issues raised in this 
case is a mixed question of law and fact. Although Mr. Palmer did 
not specifically attack the trial court's factual determinations in 
his opening brief, to the extent that such factual determinations 
are "clearly erroneous," they must be discarded by this Court in 
assessing the legal conclusions. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989).1 An 
example of one such "clearly erroneous" finding is the trial court's 
determination that "it would have taken a minimum of two hours to 
obtain a search warrant." T 77. As set forth above, Sgt. Mayo 
testified that he could have obtained a search warrant within two 
hours. T 40-1. This testimony establishes that it would have taken 
a maximum of two hours to obtain a warrant. 
Other than the clarifications set forth above, Appellant 
relies on the Statement of Facts contained in his opening brief at 
2-6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel relied heavily on Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966), in his argument in the trial court and argued 
all three prongs of the Schmerber test. He presented evidence that 
1
 In the statements made by the trial court and attached 
as an addendum to the State's brief, the trial judge appears for the 
most part to be reiterating testimony rather than making formal 
findings. 
- 2 -
the test was not a reasonable method nor done in a reasonable 
manner. The State responded to the reasonable means argument by 
arguing that the x-ray was a reasonable method done in a reasonable 
manner. The trial court ruled on the prong. Under such 
circumstances, the State's position that Appellant failed to 
preserve his argument that the x-ray was not conducted in a 
reasonable manner is without merit. 
The State concedes that the trial court's depiction of 
exigent circumstances is "unique" but asks this Court to expand the 
concept beyond its traditional confines. The State offers no 
rationale for such an expansion. The exigent circumstances 
rationale would swallow the rule if expanded to this situation. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the 
circumstances of this case. An independent investigation which 
would have led to the recovery of the ring was not in place when the 
x-ray was taken, nor would routine procedures at the jail have led 
to the discovery. Applying the doctrine under these circumstances 
would widen the exception to cover almost any search. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE WARRANTLESS X-RAY OF APPELLANT 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The State agrees that taking an x-ray is the type of bodily 
intrusion to which the fourth amendment is applicable and that the 
analysis set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
is applicable to the instant case. Appellee's Brief at 5-6. 
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A. X-RAYING MR. PALMER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE WAS NOT A REASONABLE METHOD NOR WAS IT 
DONE IN A REASONABLE MANNER. 
Although the State has chosen not to respond directly to 
Mr. Palmer's argument regarding this prong of the Schmerber test, 
the State's lack of response by no means removes this issue from 
this Court's review. See Appellee's Brief at 6. As Mr. Palmer set 
forth in his opening brief at 10, 12 and 21, one of the three prongs 
of the Schmerber test requires that the method chosen be reasonable 
and that the test be conducted in a reasonable manner. The State 
agrees that Schmerber is applicable to the instant case and agrees 
that this prong is one aspect of the Schmerber test. Despite the 
fact that Appellant relied extensively on Schmerber in the trial 
court, presented evidence of the unreasonable method and manner of 
conducting the x-ray to the trial court, specifically addressed that 
prong in argument, albeit briefly, and received a ruling from the 
trial judge as to that prong, the State refused to respond directly 
to the serious claims raised by Mr. Palmer regarding the procedure 
utilized, claiming instead that the argument regarding this prong is 
expanded on appeal, was not raised in the trial court, and should 
not be considered by this Court. 
Although the State's waiver argument has no basis in the 
context of this case, Mr. Palmer is compelled to briefly address it. 
First, defense counsel extensively relied on Schmerber and 
the three-prong test set forth therein. T 63. He specifically 
articulated the reasonable method and manner test. 
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The first is the [methods] used to effectuate the 
search must be reasonable. In Schmerber, there was 
a blood test, hospital conditions, that sort of 
thing. I would simply submit it on the evidence 
presented. 
T 63. Defense counsel had already presented evidence that x-rays 
were dangerous. T 53-54. He had also presented evidence that 
Appellant was physically restrained, pinned against a wall by three 
officers, grabbed at the throat by one officer while the other two 
held him, moved him toward the table, and physically held him down 
on the table while he struggled to get away. T 51-3.2 
In the interest of saving time, avoiding repetition, and 
not belaboring the obvious, lawyers often raise an issue for a trial 
or appellate court, then submit it on the evidence, briefs or 
argument already presented. Submission of an issue does not mean, 
as the State seems to contend, that the lawyer concedes the issue 
doe not have merit, is waived, or even that it is weak. It simply 
means that counsel will not present further argument on that issue 
2
 In responding to defense counsel's argument regarding 
this prong of the Schmerber test, the prosecutor stated: 
First of all, the reasonable methods have been 
used. I submit that in the medical environment, the 
doctor looking at him first . . . 
I think the x-ray is a reasonable method to be 
used. There is no giving of Ipecac syrup making him 
regurgitate. That is a - elation, I think, of due 
process. I think the Cc Is about that. That is 
unreasonable but an x-rc 3 a minimal intrusion. 
T 69. Hence, the prosecutor addressed both the manner and method 
employed. 
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and will submit it to the Court for the Court's decision. 
If this Court were to accept the State's argument that the 
issue is waived in this context, trial courts will be deluged with 
endless arguments from counsel who is worried he or she has not said 
enough. The State's argument that trial counsel did not elaborate 
enough to preserve his argument ignores the practical realities of 
the trial court where, at times, an issue has been fully presented 
and the judge is eager to move on; a wise lawyer will submit his 
issue under such circumstances. 
The State relies on State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985), for its position that this Court should not consider 
the argument as to this prong. Carter is easily distinguishable 
from the instant case. 
In Carter, the defendant argued in the trial court that the 
officers did not have grounds to frisk him because there were not 
reasonable grounds to believe he was armed and dangerous. 707 P.2d 
at 659. On appeal, the defendant raised the additional argument, 
which had not been mentioned in the trial court, that the 
warrantless search of his backpack was invalid because it was not 
done incident to arrest. This second argument required a different 
legal analysis and a focus on different facts than the first 
argument. 
By contrast, as the State points out in its brief (State's 
Brief at 1), "[t]he sole issue" presented in this case is whether 
the x-ray search was unlawful, requiring suppression of the ring and 
x-ray. Counsel relied on Schmerber and raised the issue regarding 
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this prong. This was sufficient to preserve the issue. 
In addition to counsel adequately raising the issue, the 
trial judge issued a ruling on this prong. T 79-80. While it might 
be appropriate in some circumstances to find waiver where the trial 
judge has not had an opportunity to analyze the facts and law 
regarding a certain issue, where a trial judge has in fact had such 
an opportunity and actually issued an order, no rationale for 
finding waiver exists. 
On appeal, counsel for Mr. Palmer simply developed an 
argument which had been raised in the trial court. Although the 
opening brief broke the issue down into two subcategories— 
(1) whether the method itself was reasonable and (2) whether the 
manner in which it was conducted was reasonable—the two 
subcategories actually make up one prong of the Schmerber test. 
This prong was raised, and evidence was introduced and submitted; 
the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal.3 
B. TRADITIONAL EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT EXIST 
IN THIS CASE AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE 
EXCEPTION FOR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The State acknowledges in its brief at 12 that the facts in 
this case do not fall within the realm of traditional exigent 
circumstances. The State points out that "[t]his is so because the 
3
 Mr. Palmer refers this Court to his opening bri^f at 
21-26 for his substantive argument as to the serious violate n which 
occurred in this case when a bodily intrusion search was conducted 
in an unreasonable manner by an unreasonable method. 
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exigent circumstances identified by the trial court involve the 
possible destruction or concealment of evidence not necessarily 
thought to be in the place to be searched—i.e., the interior of the 
defendant's body." State's Brief at 12-13. 
The State acknowledges further that the rationale in 
People v. Williams. 510 N.E.2d 445 (111. App. 1987), regarding what 
constitutes exigent circumstances is "unique" and that the question 
of whether exigent circumstances existed in this case "is admittedly 
a close one" (State's Brief at 14, 15) but asks this Court to expand 
the concept of exigent circumstances beyond its traditional scope to 
include the circumstances of this case. 
The State, however, offers no rationale in support of such 
an expansion, other than the argument that a single appellate court 
in Illinois expanded the concept in such a fashion. This is not 
sufficient to demonstrate the appropriateness of widening the 
concept beyond its traditional confines. In addition, it fails to 
address the concerns articulated by Mr. Palmer in his opening brief 
at 15-16 that such an expansion of the concept of exigent 
circumstances would swallow the rule and lead to a finding of 
exigent circumstances in almost every search.4 
In State v. Larocco, Case No. 870412 (filed May 30, 1990), 
4
 In United States v. Gorski, 582 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 
1988) (cited by the State on page 18 of its brief), the Court stated: 
Exigent circumstances are one of the few "jealously 
and carefully drawn" exceptions to the need for a 
search warrant. 
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the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the importance of simplifying 
search and seizure rules, Larocco, slip OP. at 15. The Court 
further emphasized that Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution 
requires a warrant unless traditional exigent circumstances exist. 
The Court stated, "warrantless searches will be permitted only where 
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the 
safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence [citation omitted]." Larocco, slip op. at 16. The Court 
continued by quoting Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in 
State v. Hvqh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985): 
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the 
officers with concealed weapons or will destroy 
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why 
the officers cannot take the time to secure a 
warrant. Such a requirement would present little 
impediment to police investigations, especially in 
light of the ease with which warrants can be 
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.). 
Larocco. slip op. at 16. 
In the face of the Utah Supreme Court's recent attempt to 
simplify search and seizure law and its restriction of exigent 
circumstances to the "traditional justification," there is no basis 
for this Court to expand the concept of exigent circumstances to fit 
the circumstances of the present case. 
C. THERE WAS NOT A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE RING 
WOULD BE FOUND INSIDE MR. PALMER. 
Mr. Palmers argument regarding this prong of the Schmerber 
test is adequately argued in Appellant's opening brief at 18-21. 
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POINT II. THE "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY11 ARGUMENT DOES 
NOT MAKE THIS OTHERWISE ILLEGAL SEARCH LAWFUL. 
In his arguments in the trial court, the prosecutor focused 
on exigent circumstances as "what this case hinges on." T 69. 
Without developing any argument or citing any case law, the 
prosecutor did briefly state that "there is almost an inevitability 
of discovery." T 71. The trial court did not address the 
inevitable discovery argument in its ruling. 
On appeal, the State contends that the officers would have 
inevitably discovered the ring and that even if this Court deems the 
search illegal, the evidence nevertheless would be admissible. 
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court refused to suppress evidence which was obtained in 
violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, 
reasoning that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered. 
The Court reached its decision by relying on the facts in the record 
which established that search parties were already looking for the 
body and had approached the actual location of the body. Nix, 467 
U.S. at 391. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, 
the Court concludes that unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence may be admitted at trial if it inevitably 
would have been discovered in the same condition by 
an independent line of investigation that was 
already being pursued when the constitutional 
violation occurred. 
Id. at 459 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, 
also focused on the necessity of having the independent line of 
investigation in place for the inevitable discovery doctrine to 
apply. 
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The majority is correct to insist that any rule of 
exclusion not provide the authorities with an 
incentive to commit violations of the Constitution. 
Ante, at 445-446, 81 L Ed 2d, at 388-389. If the 
inevitable discovery rule provided such an incentive 
by permitting the prosecution to avoid the 
uncertainties inherent in its search for evidence it 
would undermine the constitutional guarantee itself, 
and therefore be inconsistent with the deterrent 
purposes of the exclusionary rule [footnote 
omitted]. But when the burden of proof on the 
inevitable discovery question is placed on the 
prosecution, ante, at 444, 81 L Ed 2d, at 387-388, 
it must bear the risk of error in the determination 
made necessary by its constitutional violation. The 
uncertainty as to whether the body would have been 
discovered can be resolved in its favor here only 
because, as the Court explains ante, at 448-450, 81 
L Ed 2d, at 390-391 petitioner adduced evidence 
demonstrating that at the time of the constitutional 
violation an investigation was already under way 
which, in the natural and probable course of events, 
would have soon discovered the body. 
Id. at 456-7 (emphasis added). Hence, although in Nix v. Williams 
the Court did not articulate the precise parameters of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, it did require that an independent 
line of investigation be in place at the time the constitutional 
violation occurred. 
Various commentators and courts have criticized the 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine and cautioned that 
it must be strictly applied so that police misconduct will not be 
sanctioned and the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule can 
remain effective. See 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.4(a) at 
381-3 (2d ed. 1987). 
As LaFave notes: 
As one commentator put it: 
Such a rule is completely at odds with the purpose 
of the exclusionary rule. If the police will only 
- 11 -
be deprived of that evidence which the defendant can 
show they would not have been able to obtain had 
they not engaged in the illegality, they will in no 
way be deterred from such conduct; all they will 
stand to lose is what they would not have otherwise 
had and they might gain some advantage if something 
slips by. Moreover, the illegal route is often 
faster and easier than the legally required route 
[footnote omitted]. 
Id. at 381. LaFave agrees that the concerns are legitimate but 
believes that the argument is "directed not so much to the rule 
itself as to its application in a loose and unthinking fashion." In 
his discussion of the appropriate application of the rule, LaFave 
suggests that the rule should be applied in a manner so as not to 
encourage "unconstitutional shortcuts" and that courts should be 
"extremely careful not to apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule upon 
the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to what 
otherwise might have occurred." Id. at 383. 
Various courts have ruled that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine is not applicable "where its use would, as a practical 
matter, operate to nullify important Fourth Amendment safeguards." 
LaFave Supp. p.31. In People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. App. 
1981), decided prior to Nix, the Court refused to find that the 
evidence would have inevitably been discovered, pointing out that if 
it were to apply in that case, 
[E]very warrantless nonexigent seizure automatically 
would be legitimatized by assuming the hypothetical 
alternative that a warrant had been obtained. 
In Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d 818 (Mass. 1981), the 
Court "declinedfd] to apply the rule in a situation where its effect 
would be to read out of the Constitution the requirement that the 
- 12 -
police follow certain protective procedures—in this case, the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. [citation omitted].11 
Id. at 823. See also State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 
1981) ("If the inevitable discovery theory applied when a short cut 
was taken, . . . the net result would be that the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause as required by the fourth amendment 
would be eliminated for all practical purposes.11). 
In the present case, application of the inevitable 
discovery rule would serve to "nullify important Fourth Amendment 
safeguards" and encourage "unconstitutional shortcuts." In all 
cases where officers seek to do a bodily intrusion search of an 
in-custody defendant, the State could argue that the person could 
have been placed in an isolation cell and the evidence eventually 
obtained. Allowing officers to use evidence obtained from a bodily 
intrusion search where the kicking defendant was held down on the 
table would completely undermine the deterrence rationale of the 
exclusionary rule. In the future, officers would commit the 
unconstitutional bodily intrusion because it was faster and easier 
than placing the defendant in isolation or obtaining a warrant, then 
argue for admission of the evidence saying "we would have done it 
the right way and gotten the evidence anyway." The deterrence 
rationale requires that the inevitable discovery doctrine not be 
applied in this case. 
Where the rule is applicable, Nix v. Williams appears to 
limit relief under the rule only to situations where an independent 
investigation which was already in place would have led to the 
- 13 -
discovery of the evidence. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-6, 456-7, 459. In 
United States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), 
the Court pointed out that "if evidence is obtained by illegal 
conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the police possessed 
and were pursuing lawful means of discovery at the time the 
illegality occurred" (emphasis added). The Court noted that this 
requirement is "sound" because "a valid search warrant nearly always 
can be obtained after the search has occurred, [and] a contrary 
holding would practically destroy "the warrant requirement." 
Since Nix was decided, both the Second and Ninth Circuit 
Courts of Appeal have extended the rule to include a requirement 
that either an independent investigation is in place or invariable, 
routine procedures would have unearthed the evidence. See United 
States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) ("routine 
booking procedure and inventory would have inevitably resulted in 
discovery of cocaine"); United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 
(2d Cir. 1988) (discovery not inevitable since the "record reveals 
no evidence that [inventory] searches were an invariable, routine 
procedure in the booking and detention of a suspect at the 
particular FBI office involved"); United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 
872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]his circuit does not 
require that the evidence be obtained from a previously initiated, 
independent investigation. [citation omitted]. The government can 
meet its burden by establishing that, by following routine 
procedures, the police would inevitably have uncovered the 
evidence. [citation omitted]."). 
14 -
In Ramirez-Sandoval, the Court focused on the evidence 
which was present in the district court and held that although the 
officer could have questioned the individuals in the van, the 
government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it would have done so. The Court pointed out that the officer's 
testimony contained "no suggestion that he intended to question the 
occupants of the van, and no evidence to that effect was introduced 
in the hearing." 872 F.2d at 1400. See also LaFave at 384 ("The 
significance of the word 'would' cannot be overemphasized. It is 
not enough to show that the evidence 'might' or 'could' have been 
otherwise obtained. Once the illegal act is shown to have been in 
fact the sole effective cause of the discovery of certain evidence, 
such evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution severs the 
causal connection by an affirmative showing that it would have 
acquired the evidence in any event. In order to avoid the 
exclusionary rule, the government must establish that it has not 
benefitted by the illegal acts of its agents; a showing that it 
might not have so benefitted is insufficient."). 
The State contends that Mr. Palmer "effectively concedes" 
that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by arguing 
in his opening brief that officers could have placed him in 
isolation. The fact that officers could have placed Mr. Palmer in 
isolation does not mean they would have, and Mr. Palmer by no means 
conceded this point in his opening brief. 
In the present case, when the officers x-rayed Mr. Palmer, 
an independent investigation which would have recovered the evidence 
- 15 -
was not in place. Sergeant Mayo telephoned the jail to find out 
whether the jail had the capability of keeping Mr. Palmer under 
surveillance and recovering the ring if it passed in feces. T 28, 
32. As a result of the phone call, Sgt. Mayo apparently ascertained 
that the jail did not have such a capability. T 34-5. Although the 
jail could place Mr. Palmer in isolation, it could not provide 
personnel to keep him under surveillance. T 31-3. Sergeant Mayo 
was concerned that if Mr. Palmer were not under surveillance, he 
could repeatedly pass and reingest the ring. T 34. He apparently 
therefore did not consider placing Mr. Palmer in isolation as an 
option. T 34-5. 
This testimony establishes that the officers had not taken 
independent steps to obtain the ring by placing Mr. Palmer in 
isolation. Although Sgt. Mayo could have provided one of his men to 
observe Mr. Palmer, the Sergeant's testimony does not indicate any 
attempts or even thoughts of doing so. The State failed to 
establish that an independent investigation was underway; in fact, 
all of the testimony demonstrates that no such independent 
investigation was underway or intended unless a positive result was 
obtained from the x-ray. 
Nor did the State introduce any evidence which would 
support a determination that isolation and surveillance were an 
invariable routine process. In fact, Sgt. Mayo's testimony 
demonstrates the opposite—that the jail did not have the capability 
to carry out the procedure and did not routinely isolate suspects. 
See T 28, 32. 
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The only reason the State ultimately placed Mr. Palmer in 
isolation is because the illegal x-ray located the ring. As the 
Court pointed out in People v. Knapp. 422 N.E.2d at 536, where the 
subsequent recovery of the evidence is triggered by or the fruit of 
the illegal search, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not 
apply. See also United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d at 
1396, quoting United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864-5 (9th 
Cir. 1987) ("This doctrine requires that 'the fact or likelihood 
that makes the discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other 
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'11). 
In this case, officers made no other effort to obtain the 
ring and made the decision to isolate Mr. Palmer only after they 
were certain, as the result of the illegal search, that the ring 
would be found inside of him. Applying the rule in this case would 
encourage constitutional shortcuts and swallow the warrant 
requirement. The decision to isolate Mr. Palmer was the fruit of 
the illegal search. Because no independent investigation was 
underway and routine procedures would not have led to the discovery, 
allowing the inevitable discovery to "save" the illegal search in 
this case would nullify the fourth amendment requirements. 
The fourth amendment was violated in this case, and the 
evidence seized should be excluded. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand his case for a new trial absent the 
illegally seized evidence. 
SUBMITTED this 5 day of July, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 A It was possible. We were going under the 
2 degree of conviction that the Sears people had, that 
3 Mr. Palmer was working alone. 
4 Q They are not police officers? 
5 A No. 
6 Q What is a telephonic search warrant? 
7 A It's a search warrant with the authorization to 
8 conduct the search. It is obtained through a magistrate 
9 by the use of a telephone. 
10 Q When you called the County Attorney's Office, 
11 did they advise you to get a telephonic search warrant? 
12 A No, they did not. 
13 Q Did they discuss that option at all? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And they told you, you didn't need one? 
16 A Yes, that is correct. 
17 Q That you didn't need a telephonic search 
18 warrant? 
19 A Right. 
20 Q How long does it take to get a telephonic 
21 search warrant? 
22 A They have sped up the procedure to some degree. 
23 If I had gone through Metro Narcotics, a procedure which 
24 is fairly quickly, it would have taken me longer to find 
25 someone in Metro Narcotics to open up their facility for 
40 
me, that probably for me to get the search warrant, I was 
probably looking at a couple of hours. 
Q You could obtain a search warrant within two 
hours? 
A I would assume so. 
Q And when you say a search warrant, you mean a 
written search warrant with a Judge's signature? 
A As I say, it would have taken me about the same 
period of time to do either one. 
Q So, a telephonic search warrant may be quicker 
and a regular, written search warrant within two hours? 
A Yes. When I was in narcotics, I was able to 
start the procedure for a search warrant. I think I 
could get one in two or three hours. 
Q This is a Tuesday at 6:30 p.m., that we are 
talking about. 
A I don't recall the day, but it was May 3rd 
about that period of time. 
Q And that is not a difficult time to get a 
warrant either, is it? I mean, during the day? 
A It is certainly more difficult than if it had 
been 11 o'clock in the morning. 
Q Certainly. But still the two hours is a 
reasonable amount of time? 
A I would think so. 
41 
